Postings from July 2002
[Note: Some now-dead links have been removed from archived items.]

LIGHT POSTINGS: I have lots of posts today but, as Glenn Reynolds notes, I haven't posted for a couple of weeks. As I mentioned earlier, posting will be light this summer as I concentrate on finishing my book. It's way too easy to convince myself that I'm "working" when I'm just reading other blogs and writing responses to the news. [Posted 7/11.]

KASS WATCH, CONT'D: The Kass Commission's report on cloning is out, and the vote was almost exactly what Ron Bailey predicted in his January 23 Reason Online column: 10 members want a four-year moratorium on "cloning-for-biomedical research" and and a permanent ban on "cloning-to-produce-children," while 7 members want only a ban on reproductive cloning. (Ron predicted a 10-8 vote, but Yale law prof and big-money novelist Stephen Carter didn't vote and two commission members, William May and Rebecca Dresser, took the opposite positions from the ones Ron predicted.) A more accurate picture of the vote is that 7 members wanted a ban on both procedures; 3 wanted a moratorium on research cloning and a ban on reproductive cloning; and 7 wanted a ban only on reproductive cloning.

The report doesn't give a breakdown of the 7-3-7 vote; it provides the final votes and individual statements by some of the panel members. Why didn't this stacked panel wind up as stacked (in the opposite direction) as the Clinton administration's Shapiro bioethics commission? Simple. You can't put together a panel like this without including a reasonable number of working scientists. There were four on the commission: Elizabeth Blackburn, Daniel Foster, Michael Gazzaniga, and Janet Rowley, and all voted for the less restrictive option. (William Hurlbut, who voted the opposite way, has a science-sounding title, but he works as a theologian and bioethicist.)

The other three votes were SMU ethicist William May (both Texans on the commission voted for the less restrictive approach, which suggests that Bush connections were more benign than Kass connections), the always sensible and penetratingly intelligent (even when wrong) James Q. Wilson, and—the surprise to me, though not to Ron—communitarian political scientist Michael Sandel.

Of course, the other reason that the commission couldn't be completely stacked was that all the criticism of Kass prior to the commission's appointment affected its composition. That criticism forced him to publicly state that the commission would represent a range of viewpoints and make sure he wasn't shown to be a liar. On a more charitable note, the appointment of Michael Gazzaniga—a cognitive neuroscientist, which is about as far away from a Kassian mystic as they come—does demonstrate a certain sincere devotion to diverse viewpoints. But even the Meese Commission had its dissenters. [Posted 7/11.]

KASS WATCH, CONT'D 2: Fiscal watchdogs should take a look at the "council staff and consultants" list, which demonstrates that a) this really was a jobs program for neocons, particularly Public Interest alums b) people in Washington expect an amazing amount of administrative assistance. The commission had an administrative director, an executive assistant, a staff assistant, and a receptionist/staff assistant. Haven't these people ever heard of computers? What did all these clerical people do? Taxpayers might also wonder why such an eminent group needed five people, in addition to their scientific director, to help with research. [Posted 7/11.]

MORAL SENSE: It's a real pain that the commission posted its report as a bunch of downloadable Word files rather than HTML pages to which I could link. If links were possible, I'd link to "The Moral Case for Cloning-for-Biomedical-Research" in chapter six, particularly the section headed "Possible Moral Dilemmas of Proceeding," which outlines two distinct and thoughtful positions.

The first, which is also articulated well in Jim Wilson's personal statement, holds that "embryos have a developing and intermediate moral worth, such that the early human embryo has a moral status somewhere between that of ordinary human cells and that of a full human person." The second holds that "there are no sound reasons for treating the early-stage human embryo or cloned human embryo as anything special, or as having moral status greater than human somatic cells in tissue culture. A blastocyst (cloned or not), because it lacks any trace of a nervous system, has no capacity for suffering or conscious experience in any form—the special properties that, in our view, spell the difference between biological tissue and a human life worthy of respect and rights."

The two groups do not differ on their immediate policy prescriptions, with both drawing a line at 14 days of development (the point at which an embryo becomes a single individual no longer capable of twinning). The second group leaves open the possibility of changing that standard sometime in the future, grounding its definition of personhood in the existence of a brain and capacity for consciousness.

What I find particularly provocative about these positions is that I agree with both. More precisely, I agree with the continuum reasoning of the first group and the view of personood (and blastocysts) of the second. Consider Wilson's analysis below:

A fertilized cell has some moral worth, but much less than that of an implanted cell, and that has less than that of a fetus, and that less than that of a viable fetus, and that the same as of a newborn infant. My view is that people endow a thing with humanity when it appears, or even begins to appear, human; that is, when it resembles a human creature. The more a cell resembles a person, the more claims it exerts on our moral feelings. Now this last argument has no religious or metaphysical meaning, but it accords closely, in my view, with how people view one another. It helps us understand why aborting a fetus in the twentieth week is more frightening than doing so in the first, and why so-called partial birth abortions are so widely opposed. And this view helps us understand why an elderly, comatose person lacking the ability to speak or act has more support from people than a seven-week-old fetus that also lacks the ability to speak or act.

Human worth grows as humanity becomes more apparent. In general, we are profoundly grieved by the death of a newborn, deeply distressed by the loss of a nearly born infant or a late-month miscarriage, and (for most but not all people) worried but not grieved by the abortion of a seven-week-old fetus. Our humanity, and thus the moral worth we assign to people, never leaves us even if many elements of it are later stripped away by age or disease.

This fact becomes evident when we ask a simple question: Do we assign the same moral blame to harvesting organs from a newborn infant and from a seven-day-old blastocyst? The great majority of people would be more outraged by doing the former than by doing the latter. A seven-day-old blastocyst that is no more than one millimeter in diameter and contains only a hundred or so largely undifferentiated cells does not make the same moral claims on us as does a live infant. Unless everyone who makes this distinction is wrong, then the moral status of a blastocyst is vastly less compelling than that of a neo-nate.

You cannot get directly from the "is" of this observation of the human moral sense to an "ought" that that's how we should reason. But it is nonetheless a useful argument because it addresses head on the fear that this research will lead to the callous dissection of fetuses for transplants—a result I find as appalling as Leon Kass does. Wilson gives us reason to think that we won't slide down that slippery slope by explaining why we'll stop ourselves.

Like the second group, I believe that moral personhood requires a brain and capacity for consciousness. But, like the first group (or, for that matter, like Brink Lindsey), I do not think a 12-week-old fetus, or a three-week-old fetus, is morally equivalent to mere tissue. The sympathy that Wilson identifies is not only a fact of human behavior but a moral sentiment worth cultivating. That sympathy is not encouraged but deadened by the sacrifice of living, suffering persons in defense of blastocyst's rights. That sympathy is also deadened by the constant refrain of the likes of Francis Fukuyama that personhood depends on the right genes; one wonders how big a deviation is required since, for instance, people with Down syndrome don't have the normal "human" complement of chromosomes.

The interesting question to me is why I'm willing to draw an earlier line on the issue of research than on the issue of abortion. On abortion, I draw the line at personhood. On experiments, I'd draw it earlier—just as I recognize limits on cruelty to animals, even in the cause of research. Conservation of sympathy matters. Why does it seem to matter less in the case of abortion?

Not because I think abortion is a more important right than research. To the contrary, since sex is generally voluntary, making pregnancy avoidable, biomedical research seems the far more important and morally significant freedom. Unlike, say, Andrew Sullivan, who supports abortion rights and opposes embryonic stem cell research, I do not think the right to have sex without consequences is more fundamental to women's autonomy than the right to do research or the right not to die of a horrible disease.

But the abortion rights crowd does have one point in its favor: the argument for self-defense. A fetus is a parasite, albeit generally a desirable one; it claims not merely the right to exist but the right to depend for life on its mother-host. As a matter of law, which is separate from the matter of personal morality, I don't think abortion should be illegal before the fetus can reasonably be considered a person, which is to say before the development of the cerebral cortex. For the reasons Wilson outlines, as a personal matter, abortion becomes increasingly fraught as the fetus develops, requiring greater justification to be a moral act. [Posted 7/11.]

OUR GOOD FRIENDS THE SAUDIS, CONT'D: Following the advice of Saudi apologist and U.S. ambassador Robert Jordan, the Dallas Morning News dispatched a reporter to hang out in Saudi Arabia and tell readers what it's really like. He filed this story on pressures for political reform and this one on the status of women. Take home quote: "We have nothing against elections, if they bring the right people into place," said Prince Khaled Al-Faisal, governor of Asir Province.

The U.S. government tends to agree with the prince, preferring the House of Saud to the possibility of an anti-American elected government. But the House of Saud is anti-American too. It just gets to export (and foster internally) its malevolent version of Islam without challenge from the U.S. [Posted 7/11.]

OFF TARGET: I predict that Target's heavily promoted products by Philippe Starck will flop, and not just because James Lileks had so much fun mocking their pretentious labels ("Made with Glory" on a training potty). When Target launched its Michael Graves collection, it knew that the products had to sell themselves, regardless of whether the customer had ever heard of Graves—and it knew that the typical customer hadn't heard of Graves. The advertising and promotion featured the products, not the brand name. You bought the toaster because it looked cute, not because it had a big shot's name on it. You bought more Michael Graves because you liked your first purchase.

Target has sold its other designer lines the same way. The Independence Day promotion of Stephen Sprouse's red-white-and-blue graffiti patterns sold the cool looking shorts and flip-flops, not Sprouse. Look and feel, not status and names.

But the billboards for the Starck collection show "one crazy man" and zero cool products. And there's a good reason for that choice: With a few exceptions, the products aren't appealing. You aren't drawn to pick them up, the packaging isn't striking, and a lot of the products just look cheap. (The sippy cup is particularly cheesy.) The Starck products are also scattered around the store and thus hard to find even if you're looking for them. In short: It's a lot of designer hype—not at all what made Target successful. [Posted 7/11.]

SPEAKING OF CLONING: The Atlantic cover story, "Cloning Trevor," which I recommended in an earlier posting is now online, along with an interview with the author. Michael Kelly's Atlantic is a great magazine, proving just how much difference a good editor can make. Everyone should subscribe. [Posted 7/11.]

HAPPY BIRTHDAY, MILTON FRIEDMAN: Actually, the great Milton Friedman won't be having his 90th birthday until July 31. But you can post a birthday greeting on the Free to Choose site today. Don't miss the tribute from George Shultz. [Posted 7/11.]

RED, BLUE, AND SWING AMERICA: My latest D Magazine column, on the architecture of megachurches, puts me in mind of David Brooks's famous Atlantic story on Red America vs. Blue America. As you may recall, Brooks visited Franklin County, in rural Pennsylvania, and filed a lively and insightful report. It was a great piece about rural Pennsylvania. But, as I said in an upcoming episode of David Gergen's World at Large (a PBS summer replacement show), its picture of humble folks who don't take to showing off doesn't bear much resemblance to North Texas. You don't build a church that attracts 29,167 people to Easter Services by being humble. And Texas, as opposed to Pennsylvania, is Bush country—a.k.a. "Red America."

Last month, I visited Midland, Michigan. Midland has 40,000 residents and, thanks to Dow Chemical wealth, 2,300 millionaires, according to one of my hosts. (I was giving a speech at Northwood University.) It's a very humble place—part of Brooks's "Red America." Despite the wealth, you'll never see a fancy car, not even a run-of-the-mill BMW. I see more Porsches and Escalades on a single walk to Taco Diner than have probably ever driven through Midland.

It's Brooks's Red America all right, except that Michigan, like Pennsylvania, went for Gore. And Michigan, like Pennsylvania, is a swing state. This may be more than a coincidence. The more I think about it, the more I realize that what the real Red America and Blue America—the parts of the country that are reliably partisan—have in common is self-confidence and flash. They're ambitious, and they aren't afraid to make noise about it. The swing states (if not for the racial connotation, you might call them "White America") are the ones that are humble, the ones that don't cotton to public ambition. [Posted 7/11.]

FAKE DRUGS, CONT'D: Glennis Whitley, D Magazine's capable investigative reporter, lays out the tale of how a local defense attorney figured out that the police department was framing innocent immigrants, mostly mechanics, with fake drugs. [Posted 7/11.]

RUNOFF PRIMARIES: Reader Charles Lipson writes with a clarification on the history of Southern runoff primaries. I certainly agree with his history; the item below was strictly on why such primaries persist:

Southern states instituted runoff primaries in the 1890s precisely to exclude blacks from winning state-wide office, in case multiple white candidates split the vote. Runoffs were an integral feature of the new southern state constitutions that overturned Reconstruction, though they were certainly not the most important feature. "Grandfather" clauses, poll taxes, and other laws effectively restricted the vote to white males.

During the civil rights movement of the early 1960s, segregatists praised these exclusionary features of Southern elections, including Democratic primary runoffs, where victory was tantamount to election. They rightly considered runoffs an additional barrier against black electoral victory.

This does not, of course, explain the retention of runoffs in the decades since then—an era of universal voting rights ushered in by the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act of the mid-1960s.

Nowadays, of course, the South is a two-party region (although Republicans predominate). A black candidate who wins a primary that has a runoff is more likely to win the general election than a black candidate who wins with a minority of his own party. The same is true, of course, for non-black candidates. If you can't get a majority of your own party's voters, even as a second choice, how much chance do you have? I suspect runoffs are still around because voters think they're fair and politicians think they're effective at finding strong candidates. [Posted 7/11.]